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LAND WITHOUT PLEA BARGAINING: 
HOW THE GERMANS DO IT 
John H. Langbein*t 
As the death grip of adversary procedure has tightened around 
the common law criminal trial, trial has ceased to be workable as a 
routine dispositive proceeding. Our criminal justice system has be-
come ever more dependent on processing cases of serious crime 
through the nontrial procedure of plea bargaining. Unable to adju-
dicate, we now engage in condemnation without adjudication. Be-
cause our constitutions guarantee adjudication, we threaten the 
criminal defendant with a markedly greater sanction if he insists on 
adjudication and is convicted. This sentencing differential, directed 
towards inducing the defendant to waive his right to trial, makes 
plea bargaining work. It also makes plea bargaining intrinsically co-
ercive. I have elsewhere had occasion to point to the host of irreme-
diable deficiencies - moral, juridical, practical - that inhere in the 
plea bargaining system.1 
Plea bargaining is such a recent2 and transparent evasion of our 
cherished common law tradition of criminal trial that its well-mean-
ing practitioners and proponents feel a deep need for reassurance 
that what they are doing is not so bad as it looks. Rather lately, 
apologists for American plea bargaining have been sounding a 
theme purportedly derived from comparative law. As a corollary to 
the proposition that plea bargaining is not really so bad, the claim is 
advanced that everybody else does it too. Plea bargaining is said to 
be universal, at least in the legal systems of advanced industrial 
countries.3 
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. A.B. 1964, Columbia University; LL.B. 1968, 
Harvard University; LL.B. 1969, Ph.D. 1971, Cambridge University.-Ed. 
t References and suggestions from Albert Alschuler, Gerhard Casper, Joachim Herr-
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I. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (1978), expanded in a 
revision in THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Winter 1980, at 43. 
2. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 19 COLUM. L. REV. I (1979), abridged as 
Alschuler, Plea .Bargaining and Its History, 13 LAW & Socv. REV. 211 (1979); Langbein, lln• 
derstanding the Short History of Plea .Bargaining, 13 LAW & Socv. REV. 261 (1979). 
3. E.g., McDonald, From Plea Negotiation to Coercive Justice: Notes on the Respec!fication 
of a Concept, 13 LAW & Socv. REV. 385, 386 (1979); Goldstein & Marcus, The Myth of Judicial 
Supervision in Three "Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 
264-79 (1977). 
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The present Article demonstrates the error of this universalist 
theory of plea bargaining by showing how and why one major legal 
system, the West German, has so successfully avoided any form or 
analogue of plea bargaining in its procedures for cases of serious 
crime. The German criminal justice system functions without plea 
bargaining not by good fortune, but as a result of deliberate policies 
and careful institutional design whose essential elements are out-
lined in Part I. Part II addresses the American claims that a clandes-
tine plea bargaining system lurks behind veils of German pretense. 
By way of preface we should say a word about the raison d'etre 
of American plea bargaining, which is after all nothing more than 
simple expediency. We indulge in this practice of condemnation 
without adjudication because we think we have to, not because we 
want to. We know that plea bargaining lacks foundation in our con-
stitutions and in our legal traditions.4 Even among the proponents 
of plea bargaining, few indeed would contend that it is an intrinsi-
cally desirable mode of rendering criminal justice. The largest claim 
for plea bargaining is that it may approximate (although it cannot 
equal) the outcomes of true adjudication, but at lower cost. The 
Supreme Court has been mercifully frank in explaining why it feels 
obliged to treat plea bargaining as "an essential component of the 
administration of justice. . . . If every criminal charge were sub-
jected to a full-scale trial, the States and the federal government 
would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and 
court facilities."5 
The reasons for our latter-day dependence on plea bargaining are 
also tolerably well understood, although much of the detail of the 
historical development remains to be traced out. Over the two cen-
turies since the Americans constitutionalized jury trial, we have 
transformed it, submerging it in such time-consuming complexity 
that we can now employ it only exceptionally. Eighteenth-century 
criminal jury trial was a summary proceeding, still largely judge-di-
rected and lawyer-free; the law of evidence lay all but entirely in the 
future; the extended voir dire was unknown; appeal was as a practi-
cal matter unavailable.6 Felony trials took place with such remarka-
ble dispatch that judges actually discouraged defendants from 
4. See Alschuler, supra note 2; Langbein, supra note 2. See also Note, Tl,e Unconstitution-
ality oJ Plea Bargaining, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1387 (1970): 
5. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
6. This point is developed in Langbein, supra note I, at 9-11; the historical evidence is 
presented in Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1978). 
See also the summary in Langbein, supra note 2, at 262-65. 
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tendering guilty pleas.7 Plea bargaining is now "an essential compo-
nent of the administration of justice" because what the Supreme 
Court calls "full-scale trial"8 (meaning of course jury trial) has be-
come so complicated. The vast elaboration of adversary procedure 
and the law of evidence has made our constitutionally guaranteed 
trial procedure so costly that it can be used in only a tiny fraction of 
cases of serious crime. 
I. THE GERMAN WAY OF TRIAL9 
The Germans do without plea bargaining because they do not 
need it. German criminal procedure has resisted adversary domina-
tion and exclusionary rules of evidence. Trial procedure has been 
kept uncomplicated and rapid. Accordingly, all the reasons of prin-
ciple that would (and in former times did) incline us to try our cases 
of serious crime can still be felt and obeyed in Germany. 
A. Routine Nonadversa,y Trial 
German trial courts for cases of serious crime come in two vari-
eties, each composed of a panel of professional judges and laymen 
who together deliberate and decide all issues of culpability and sen-
tence. The more serious cases are tried before a court of three pro-
fessional judges and two laymen;10 the court that deals with lesser 
imprisonable offenses and with many nonimprisonable o.ffenses11 sits 
with one professional and two laymen. 12 In both courts a two-thirds 
majority is necessary to convict and to sentence. Accordingly, the 
laymen can veto the professionals, and in the lesser court override 
them. 13 The laymen are selected and assigned for service through a 
rigorously randomized scheme paralleling that used to assign 
caseloads to professional judges and are subject to pretrial challenge 
only on the narrow grounds that may disqualify the professional 
judges. 14 At the conclusion of a trial before one of these so-called 
7. Langbein, supra note 6, at 277-79. 
8. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
9. This account follows J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY 
61-86 (1977), where the relevant sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG) [hereinafter abbreviated as STPO, following German convention] 
are translated or summarized and discussed. 
I 0. The grosse Strafkammer. 
I I. The SchOffengericht. 
12. For details on the division of business among the courts, see Casper & Zeisel, Lay 
Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 141-43 (1972). 
13. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 61-63, 79-80. 
14. Id at 141-42 & n.l. 
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"mixed" courts (mixing professional judges and laymen), the court 
deliberates and decides on verdict and sentence simultaneously. The 
court's judgment discloses its findings of fact and its applications of 
law in a reasoned opinion written by a professional judge. Both de-
fense and prosecution have a liberal right to seek appellate review on 
issues of sentence as well as liability.15 
Virtually all of the features of German court structure that strike 
an Anglo-American observer as distinctive have the effect of acceler-
ating the conduct of trial by comparison with our own arrangements. 
Because it is so difficult to identify and to remedy error behind the 
one- or two-word verdict of an Anglo-American jury, we have con-
centrated over the last two centuries on devising prophylactic proce-
dures to prevent error - for instance, the voir dire of prospective 
jurors, the vast exclusionary apparatus of the law of evidence, and 
the bewildering technique of multiple contingent judicial instruc-
tions to the jury ("If you find such-and-such, then . . ."). By con-
trast, the German system has no analogue to voir dire or to the law 
of jury control, despite having laymen sit on every trial for serious 
crime and despite extending the laymen's authority to matters of sen-
tence as well as guilt determination. Professional judges speak to 
points of law only when legal issues become relevant in delibera-
tions; important legal rulings show up in the written judgment and 
are available for scrutiny on appeal. The Germans also believe that 
the presence of professionals in deliberations and the requirement of 
written findings of fact and law are sufficient safeguards against the 
misuse of potentially prejudicial varieties of evidence; accordingly, 
the general principle is that virtually all relevant evidence is admissi-
ble, and time is not spent arguing about exclusion and otherwise 
manipulating evidence in the familiar Anglo-American ways. 16 
The nonadversarial character of the proof-taking further acceler-
ates the oral public trial. To use our parlance, the presiding judge 
both "examines" and "cross-examines," after which he invites his 
fellow judges (professional and lay), the prosecutor, the defense 
counsel, and the accused to supplement his questioning. In examin-
ing, the presiding judge works from the official file of the case, the 
dossier, which contains the pretrial statements and public records 
gathered by police and prosecutors. These officials work under a 
statutory duty to investigate exculpatory as well as inculpatory evi-
dence. This duty is reinforced in the pretrial phase by giving to the 
15. Id at 80-85. 
16. Id at 66-70. 
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defense liberal rights to inspect the dossier, together with the right to 
motion the prosecution to investigate ( at public expense) any defen-
sive claims and evidence that might have been overlooked. 17 
This thorough, open, and impartial pretrial preparation eff ec-
tively eliminates surprise and forensic strategy from the trial. It also 
enables the presiding judge who determines the sequence of wit-
nesses to control for relevance and to minimize needless duplication 
of trial testimony. Thus, the court that must decide the case con-
ducts its own trial inquiry in a businesslike and undramatic fashion, 
overseen by prosecution and defense. 18 Nonadversarial procedure 
recognizes no party burdens of proof. German law adheres to a 
standard of proof not materially different from our beyond-reason-
able-doubt; 19 but without the system of adversary presentation of ev-
idence, there is no occasion to think of the "prosecution case" (or, 
indeed, of the defendant's burden of proving an "affirmative de-
fense"). The only burden is the court's. In order to convict, the 
court must satisfy itself of the truth of the charges after taking the 
relevant evidence, including that requested by prosecution and de-
fense. 
A German trial begins with the examination of the accused. The 
presiding judge must instruct him about his right to remain silent,20 
but for a variety of reasons the typical German accused feels little 
incentive to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. In the 
Anglo-American system of adversary presentation of evidence and 
party burdens of poof, the accused is effectively silenced for the du-
ration of the prosecution case. Our rule admitting past conviction 
evidence only if the accused speaks in his own defense further en-
courages him to rely wholly upon the intermediation of counsel.21 
German procedure, being free of adversary domination of the proofs 
and of exclusionary rules of evidence, has a privilege against self-
incrimination that is not overused. The German trial court thus typ-
ically hears from the accused, who is almost always the most efficient 
testimonial resource. This sequence is also an important time-saver: 
11. See Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure: "Myth" and Reality, 81 
YALE L.J. 1549, 1563 (1978), and authorities cited therein at 1563 nn.52-53. 
18. The court's discretion to refuse to hear witnesses requested by prosecution and defense 
is narrowly circumscribed. STPO § 244. The so-called rule of orality obliges the court to call 
major witnesses (subject to a few exceptions), assuring confrontation with the accused at trial. 
19. See I. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 78-79. 
20. See id at 72. 
21. See Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Proce-
dure: A Comparative Study, 121 u. PA. L. REV. 506, 527 (1973); J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 
73. 
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by speaking first with the accused, the court establishes at the outset 
of the trial precisely which (if any) matters charged by the prosecu-
tion are genuinely contested, thus limiting the range and depth of the 
subsequent proof-taking. 
The accused frequently confesses some or all of the charges 
against him, and in Part II of this Article I shall deal with sugges-
tions that such confessions evince a form of plea bargaining. The 
important point for present purposes is that German procedure 
knows no guilty plea for cases of felony or grave misdemeanor.· (For 
lesser offenses there is an analogue to our guilty plea, the penal order 
procedure discussed below.) By confessing to a major offense, an 
accused does not waive trial. Confession affects but does not abort 
the criminal trial. Confession shortens the trial by enriching the 
proofs but does not relieve the court of its duty of independent adju-
dication - its duty to satisfy itself of the accused's guilt beyond rea-
sonable doubt. · 
In an empirical study of the German mixed-court system con-
ducted in 1969-1970, Gerhard Casper and Hans Zeisel quantified 
trial duration data from a careful sample of about 600 cases. They 
found that "roughly one-half of all criminal trials (47 per cent) last 
no longer than one-third of a day, or approximately two hours. The 
average . . . duration of a [lesser court] trial is one-third of a day or 
about two hours, of a [major court] trial one day . . . ."22 My mis-
sion in what I have thus far said about German criminal procedure 
has been to make these astonishing trial duration figures comprehen-
sible to an American readership. For the rapidity of trial procedure 
is the essential factor that explains the absence of plea bargaining in 
Germany. German trial procedure, unlike American, has retained 
an efficiency that makes trial practical for every case of imprisonable 
crime. 
The rapidity of German trial procedure is not, of course, the only 
important factor; another is that crime rates in the United States are 
higher than in Germany - four times higher is a good rule of 
thumb. 23 If the Germans had our levels of serious crime, they would 
22. Casper & Zeise!, supra note 12, at 149-50 (1972). The term rendered above as "lesser 
court" is in the original SchOffengericht; as "major court," grosse Strafkammer. See text at 
notes 10-12 supra. 
23. Population-adjusted .figures for the following major offenses are given in J. LANGBEIN, 
supra note 9, at 110-11; the .figures show the ratio of these offenses in America to those in 
Germany: murder 4.45; rape 2.38; robbery 6.63; aggravated assault 2.79; auto theft 4.64. For 
an indication of the difficulty in achieving precision in such figures see Arzt, Responses to the 
Growth of Crime in the United Stales and West Germany: A Comparison of the Changes in 
Criminal Law and Societal Altitudes, 12 CORNELL INTL. L.J. 43, 45 (1979). 
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find it much more costly than they now do to operate a system in 
which all cases of very serious crime go to full trial. They would 
almost certainly need to divert more of their caseload into the non-
trial channels discussed below than they now do.24 But the Germans 
would not need a sentence differential in order to redraw their 
trial/nontrial line at some higher point on the scale of gravity of 
offenses; and within the sphere of cases deemed appropriate for trial 
in such altered circumstances, all the factors of procedural dispatch 
previously discussed would continue to spare the Germans the need 
to subvert their trial procedures by plea bargaining. 
Crime rates alone neither explain nor justify the American resort 
to plea bargaining. Plea bargaining has been documented in Eng-
land25 where crime rates are closer to German than to American 
levels;26 the constant factor in both England and the United States is, 
of course, adversary criminal procedure. 
B. The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution 
Not only can the Germans do without plea bargaining, they want 
to do without it. That is the lesson of the German scheme for elimi-
nating prosecutorial discretion in cases of serious crime. 
Section 152(11) of the Code of Criminal Procedure prescribes the 
celebrated rule of compulsory prosecution (Legalitiits_prinzi_p) that 
has been in force for a century.27 In the field of serious crime the 
German prosecutor must prosecute "all prosecutable offenses, to the 
extent that there is a sufficient factual basis."28 Section 153(1) of the 
Code permits the counterprinciple of discretionary nonprosecution 
(O_p_portunitiits_prinzi_p) but only for misdemeanors (Vergehen) and 
then only if the culprit's guilt can "be regarded as minor" and "there 
24. For the suggestion that this process is underway see Arzt, supra note 23. 
25. Baldwin & McConville, Plea Bargaining and Plea Negotiation in England, 13 LAW & 
SocY. REV. 287 (1979); J. BALDWIN & M. MCCONVILLE, NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES 
TO PLEAD GUILTY (1977). 
26. English crime rates are actually lower than German for the three gravest offenses for 
which the data is unmistakably comparable. With the American-to-German ratios in note 23 
supra, compare the population-adjusted ratios for American-to-English crime rates for the 
same year (1975); murder 9.25; rape 12.47; robbery 9.48. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM 
CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES: 1975, at 49 (1976); HOME OFFICE, CRIMINAL STA• 
TISTICS, ENGLAND AND WALES: 1976, at 358-59 (1977). (The population adjustment for En-
gland is based on the population figure in CENTRAL STATISTICAL OFFICE, MONTHLY DIGEST 
OF STATISTICS 16 (August 1979).) 
27. An outstanding account of the historical development and modem scope of the rule of 
compulsory prosecution appears in T. WEIGEND, ANKLAGEPFLICHT UND ERMESSEN: DIE 
STELLUNG DES STAATSANWALTS ZWISCHEN LEGALITATS• UND OPPORTUNITXTSPRINZIP NACH 
DEUTSCHEM UND AMERIKANISCHEM RECHT (1978). For an English-language account, see 
Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial .Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439 (1974). 
28. STPO § 152(11). 
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is no public interest in prosecuting."29 Consequently, the German 
law requires that all felonies (Verbrechen) and all misdemeanors that 
cannot be excused under the two statutory criteria of pettiness must 
be prosecuted whenever the evidence permits.30 
The strongest incentives are created to enforce this rule of com-
pulsory prosecution. If the prosecutor determines not to prosecute 
an offense that is subject to the rule - whether for want of sufficient 
factual basis or on grounds oflegal insufficiency - the victim or kin 
may obtain departmental review of the determination; if the prose-
cutor's superiors uphold his decision, the citizen may appeal to the 
courts in a proceeding to compel prosecution. The prosecutorial 
corps is a career service with strictly meritocratic promotion stan-
dards. Prosecutors do not want their personnel records blotted with 
citizen complaints, especially successful complaints. Prudence coun-
sels them to resolve doubts in favor of prosecution and trial.31 
A crucial corollary of this system is that the form of plea bargain-
ing called charge or count bargaining in American practice can have 
no counterpart in German procedure. The prosecutor, who is duty-
bound to prosecute in every case, lacks authority, for example, to 
offer to reduce the charge in return for a concession of guilt. The 
rule of compulsory prosecution requires him to take the case to trial 
in the strongest and most inclusive form that the evidence will sup-
port; if he does not, the court itself is empowered to correct his er-
ror. 32 So strict is the rule that it prevents the Germans from 
employing that endemic device of Anglo-Ametjcan prosecutorial 
practice, the grant of immunity for state's evidence.33 
Obviously, the German rule of compulsory prosecution of seri-
ous crime is no happenstance. The statutory standards, limitations, 
and remedies have been meticulously designed to fit the institutional 
structure and to serve the larger policies of the German criminal jus-
tice system. The rule is meant to achieve ends that are immensely 
important in the German tradition: treating like cases alike, obeying 
faithfully the legislative determination to characterize something as a 
29. STPO § 153(1). 
30. There are a few statutory exceptions, of no quantitative importance, collected in 
Langbein, supra note 27, at 458 n.48. 
31. For a discussion of these incentives to prosecute in tenable cases see id at 448-50, 463-
67. 
32. STPO § 206, discussed in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 9. See also STPO §§ 155(11), 
264-66, discussed in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 66-67. 
33. Proposals to adopt the Anglo-American practice are periodically made and defeated in 
Germany. See the discussion and authorities cited in T. WEIGEND, supra note 27, at 35 & 
n.116; Arzt, supra note 23, at 49 n.20. 
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serious crime, preventing political interference or other corruption 
from inhibiting prosecution, and more.34 The wisdom of these poli-
cies is not lost on Americans, but we lack the procedural institutions 
- above all a workable trial procedure - that would allow us to 
have a comparable rule of compulsory prosecution. As long as we 
depend upon plea bargaining to resolve our caseloads, we must give 
our prosecutors their bargaining chips. 
Toward the bottom of the range of crimes so serious that they are 
subject to the rule of compulsory prosecution are those for which the 
sanction of imprisonment either is not allowed at all or would be 
inappropriate in the particular case. Some of these offenses are rela-
tively common, including various smaller larcenies and serious mo-
tor vehicle offenses. In these cases prosecution may occur under a 
nontrial procedure called the penal order (Strafbej'eh/); here, there-
fore, compulsory prosecution does not mean compulsory trial. Im-
mediately below in Part II, I shall describe the working of this short-
form penal order procedure, which has been a main subject of 
American efforts to find plea bargaining analogues in German prac-
tice. I shall also take up in Part II certain facets of the German han-
dling of petty crime - those misdemeanors that fall beneath the 
statutory reach of the rule of compulsory prosecution. For although 
the proposition that I am addressing is that German criminal proce-
dure functions without plea bargaining in cases of serious crime, 
analogues drawn from German procedures for handling petty crime 
have a way of turning up in American critiques of the German sys-
tem without due regard to the bright line that is drawn in Germany 
between the procedural standards appropriate to serious and to petty 
crime. 
II. CONFUSIONS WITH PLEA BARGAINING 
German law forbids plea bargaining, and German legal profes-
sionals of all sorts -judges, prosecutors, academics, and (most im-
portantly) defense counsel - consistently maintain that the law is 
obeyed. The disdain that American plea bargaining evokes in Ger-
many is not confined to legal circles. Even in the ordinary press, 
American plea bargaining is regarded with astonishment bordering 
on incredulity.35 
34. Langbein, supra note 27, at 448-50. 
35. See id at 457 n.44: 
Plea bargaining is all but incomprehensible to the Germans, whose ordinary disposi-
tive procedure is workable without such evasions. In the German press the judicial proce-
dure surrounding the resignation of Vice President Agnew was viewed with the sort of 
wonder normally inspired by reports of the customs of primitive tribes. ''The resignation 
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So much is, I believe, conceded even by the American observers 
who purport to discern plea bargaining analogues in German prac-
tice. We can distinguish two main themes in this American writing. 
The more charitable critique is what we might call the delusion the-
sis: The Germans know not what they do; if they were to analyze 
certain of their procedures correctly, they would find that they have 
not eliminated plea bargaining but only concealed it from them-
selves. The harsher form of American critique is the deception the-
sis: German prosecutors and courts knowingly engage in plea 
bargaining, thus lying and lawbreaking. 
Two facets of German criminal procedure inspire most of this 
critique, the nontrial penal order procedure and the use of confes-
sion evidence in trial procedure. These we now examine. 
A. Penal Order Procedure 
The rule of compulsory prosecution manifests itself in the re-
quirement of compulsory trial, we have said, whenever prosecution 
may result in imprisonment. For cases of misdemeanor in which im-
prisonment is not in question, German law permits the penal order 
procedure, an alternative procedure that is both nontrial and conces-
sionary. I have elsewhere called this procedure "the German guilty 
plea."36 Penal order procedure lacks, however, that terrible attribute 
that defines our plea bargaining and makes it coercive and unjust: 
the sentencing differential by which the accused is threatened with 
an increased sanction for conviction after trial by comparison with 
that which is offered for confession and waiver of trial. 
Penal order procedure is meant to be used in uncomplicated 
cases of overwhelming evidence - for instance, against the shop-
lifter caught-in-the-act or the drunk driver whose blood sample in-
criminates him. The Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the 
prosecutor to prepare the penal order, which takes the form of a 
draft judgment of the lowest criminal court. After the prosecutor 
presents the draft and the official file to the court, the judge routinely 
approves and issues the order without a hearing or serious considera-
tion of its merits.37 The order speaks as a provisional judgment of 
the court: "Unless you object by such-and-such date, you are hereby 
occurred as part of a 'cow-trade,' as it can only in the United States be imagined." Badis-
che Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1973, at 3, col. 2. 
36. Langbein, supra note 27, at 455. 
37. "A judge in Hamburg told me that he could review 70 routine cases in fifteen minutes 
(shoplifting, for instance, or riding a subway without a ticket), an average of one case every 13 
seconds; more attention is obviously paid to unusual cases." Felstiner, Plea Contracts in West 
Germany, 13 LAW & SocY. REV. 309, 312 (1979) (emphasis original). 
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sentenced to such-and-such criminal sanction(s) on account of such-
and-such conduct which offends such-and-such criminal proscrip-
tion(s)." The document instructs the accused that if he makes a 
timely objection (within one week) he is entitled to a full criminal 
trial. If he does object, the penal order becomes nugatory and an 
ordinary trial will take place as though the penal order had never 
issued. 
Two major aspects of penal order procedure distinguish it from 
American plea bargaining: the limitation to nonimprisonable misde-
meanors and the absence of a sentencing differential. The former is 
explicit in the statute, and we need hardly belabor the contrast with 
American practice, where plea bargaining is routine for felonies and 
serious misdemeanors. 
However, the statute does not by its terms prevent the imposition 
of a higher sentence on an accused who declines a penal order and is 
thereafter convicted at trial. Such a prohibition would collide with 
important principles of German criminal procedure - the prosecu-
tor's duty not to recommend a sentence at trial until he has heard all 
the evidence adduced there, and the trial court's responsibility to in-
form itself similarly before imposing sentence. Thus, it remains 
open to the prosecutor to decide that the case appears more serious 
after trial than when he proposed the rejected penal order, and ac-
cordingly to recommend a higher sentence. He would, however, 
have to substantiate that view in order to persuade the court; and the 
cases in which prosecutors initially employ penal order procedure 
are just those relatively uncomplicated ones in which it would be 
hardest to make out such a claim, cases in which there will seldom be 
any incriminating evidence adduced at trial beyond that already 
known to the prosecutor (and so recorded in the dossier) at the time 
of the issuance of the rejected penal order. 
For this "German guilty plea" to support a German plea bar-
gaining system, prosecutors would have to recommend and courts 
would have to impose such increased penalties in rejected penal or-
der cases with sufficient frequency to achieve the necessary deterrent 
e.ffect. The American sentencing differential works by threat: "con-
cede guilt and accept X penalty, or go to trial and risk X-plus.'' In 
the form of plea bargaining styled "explicit," the prosecutor delivers· 
the threat in negotiations with the accused or his counsel. In so-
called "implicit" plea bargaining, the differential is nonnegotiated. 
In either case the system depends upon a widespread understanding 
of the existence of the differential. The deal or tariff must be com-
municated to the accused, at minimum by his defense counsel, and 
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sometimes by the prosecutor or judge as well. Happily for the task 
of sensible researchers, a plea bargaining system must leave unmis-
takable traces in the work of the legal professionals. Even where, as 
for example, in contemporary England, official ideology has been 
until lately loath to acknowledge the existence of plea bargaining, 
researchers have been able to document regular patterns of sentenc-
ing differential from interviews with numerous accused and defense 
counsel.38 
So far as I am aware, no one has even disputed the proposition 
that it would violate German law for prosecutors or judges to at-
tempt to institute such sentencing differentials. Further, so far as I 
am aware, every American investigator who has explored the Ger-
man practice in interviews with German legal professionals - in-
cluding defense counsel - has found complete adherence to the 
position that no such sentencing differential exists. 39 The how-to-do-
it handbooks for German defense counsel cover penal order practice 
without a hint of any sentencing differential that counsel might ad-
vise about or exploit,40 a marked contrast to American literature of 
this genre. A real insight of the last decade's plea bargaining schol-
arship in the United States has been to show how extensively the 
plea bargaining system depends upon the cooperation and activity of 
defense counsel, and how clearly defense counsel finds it in his own 
interest to disclose - indeed exaggerate - the importance of his 
role.41 Americans who think they find a plea bargaining system in 
German penal order practice have never reconciled their claim with 
the statements of German defense counsel that there is no sentencing 
differential for counsel to communicate, manipulate, or complain 
about. 
In 1978 a pair of American coauthors did point to what they 
called "evidence"42 of a sentencing differential in the penal order 
system: a remark in Bruns's treatise on sentencing law that penal 
orders are "often increased" (oft erhoht) following conviction at 
38. See sources cited in note 25 supra. 
39. See, e.g., the remarks ofFelstiner, supra note 37, at 317, 319-20. 
40. The leading German work is H. DAHS, HANDBUCH DES STRAFVERTEIDIGERS (4th ed. 
1977). The advantages that the author identifies for the accused in accepting a penal order are 
entirely of the "process cost" variety. He speaks of the emotional burden of defending crimi-
nal charges through all levels of trial and appeal, the time that elapses, the publicity, the injury 
to reputation, and the "moral and economic ruin" thereby occasioned. Id at 558. There is no 
mention of sentencing leniency as a quid pro quo for accepting a penal order. A similar treat-
ment appears in H. SCHORN, DER STRAFVERTEIDIGER 183 (1966). 
41. Alschuler, The .Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179 (1975). 
42. Goldstein & Marcus, Comment on Continental Criminal Procedure, 87 YALE L.J. 1570, 
1574 (1978). 
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trial. 43 Bruns, however, makes no attempt to document this asser-
tion. His only authority, on which he evidently expanded, is a com-
plaint uttered in a law review article a quarter century ago (at the 
dawn of the routinization and expansion of the modem penal order 
system) by an appellate judge who suspected trial courts of engaging 
in this forbidden practice.44 
Lamentably, the coauthors who relied upon Bruns's remark did 
not discuss the information in the remainder of Bruns's paragraph. 
Bruns there points out that the principal appellate case on the ques-
tion of increased sentences in rejected penal order cases (decided in 
1966) requires that the grounds for increasing a sentence beyond that 
recommended in the rejected penal order be clearly set forth in the 
trial court's judgment.45 Bruns then endorses the views of a contem-
porary commentator on the 1966 case, who developed the court's 
reasoning and statutory interpretation to show that the only permis-
sible ground for increasing or decreasing a sentence proposed in a 
rejected penal order was the appearance at trial of evidence not indi-
cated in the pretrial dossier when the rejected penal order issued.46 
Since the American coauthors admit that a punitive sentencing dif-
ferential would be illegal and a ground for reversal on appeal, 47 
what is left of their claim is the notion that the first instance courts -
despite the modem requirement that they state reasons for increased 
sentences - might be disobeying the law and imposing sentencing 
differentials so stealthily that neither defense counsel nor the appel-
late courts (staffed exclusively with former first instance judges) 
could detect it. 
More recently, the American investigator Felstiner examined this 
question afresh in interviews with a cross section of German 'Judges, 
prosecutors, and academics," who persuaded him that "defendants 
are ... not penalized for rejecting a penal order and insisting upon 
a trial."48 Felstiner points out how the mechanics of penal order 
practice reinforce this conclusion: 
43. Id at 1575 n.18 (citing H. BRUNS, STRAFZUMESSUNGSRECHT 607 (2d ed. 1974)). 
44. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 42, at 1575 n.18 (citing H. BRUNS, supra note 43, at 
607). Bruns was discussing a section of an article on "mistakes in sentencing,'' Seibert, Feh/er 
bei der Strafzumessung, 6 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 457, 459 (1952). 
45. H. BRUNS, supra note 43, at 608 (citing the decision of the Oberlandesgericht 
Zweibnlcken of Aug. 24, 1966 (noted in 21 MONATSSCHRIFT FOR DEUTSCHES RECHT 236 
(1967))). The case is also reported in a reporter not available to me, 32 Verkehrsrechtssam-
mlung 219, the source to which Bruns cites. 
46. Ostler, § 411 Abs. 3 STPO- "/darer Wort/out" und wirklicher Sinn, 21 NEUE JURIS• 
TISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 486 (1968). 
47. Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 42, at 1575 n.18. 
48. Felstiner, supra note 37, at 314. 
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First, the penal order is an open offer. The defendant can accept it at 
any time before trial simply by withdrawing his objection or paying the 
fine: even a failure to show up for the trial is treated as an acceptance. 
Once the trial has begun, the defendant -with the prosecutor's ap-
proval - can accept the penal order until final judgment is d~livered. 
That approval is generally given. (A veteran prosecutor in Bremen 
told me that it is always given.) . . . 
German legal ideology, moreover, is opposed to penalizing people 
for their own tactical mistakes. For instance a German defendant who 
appeals from a trial court decision and secures a new trial cannot end 
up with a sentence more severe than that originally imposed. German 
legal principles, then, suggest to prosecutors that it would be unfair to 
penalize a defendant for not accepting a penal order at an earlier stage. 
This attitude is so strong that one prosecutor, after eight years in the 
role, told me wrongly that even the judge could not sentence a defend-
ant more harshly than the sentence offered in a rejected penal order. 
In practice, when a trial appears to be going less well than a de-
fendant had expected, he offers to accept the penal order and the pros-
ecutor lets him do so.49 
The attempt to inf er a clandestine plea bargaining system from 
penal order procedure in violation of German law not only conflicts 
with the results of German and American legal scholarship, but also 
ignores the institutional contexts that explain both the existence of 
plea bargaining in America and its absence in Germany. As I have 
emphasized in Part I of this Article, German trial procedure is so 
rapid that the German prosecutor does not work under the same 
pressure that his American counterpart feels to divert cases of serious 
crime into the nontrial channel. The savings in trial time in the kind 
of case (misdemeanor, uncomplicated facts, overwhelming evidence) 
that is appropriate for penal order procedure could not be large 
enough to tempt the German officials to illegality, in view of the 
enormous sanctions that would threaten them upon detection. so 
Furthermore, the prosecutorial career structure does not place the 
German prosecutor under the incentive to "win" that his American 
counterpart feels. His performance is not judged by the electorate in 
a contest with a political opponent who may chide him for an inade-
quate conviction rate. German prosecutors undergo periodic depart-
mental review on a variety of factors including dispatch in handling 
caseloads (dismissals as well as prosecutions); intra-office relations; 
legal analysis and drafting; and the avoidance of judicial rebuke and 
citizen complaint.51 Whereas evidence suggests that American pros-
49. Id at 314-15 (emphasis in original). 
50. See K. PETERS, STRAFPROZESS 142 (2d ed. 1966). 
51. See T. WEIGEND, supra note 27, at 98-102 
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ecutors do some of their hardest bargaining in their weaker or more 
doubtful cases, 52 the incentives of the German system point the Ger-
man prosecutor firmly toward dismissing weak cases and trying the 
rest. 
The penal order/plea bargaining fallacy is, therefore, rather a 
classic example of the false cognate in comparative law. Mechanical 
resemblances - nontrial and concessionary procedure - have been 
emphasized. Fundamental dissimilarities - the limitation to misde-
meanor, the want of a sentencing differential, and the factors that 
explain those differences - have been disregarded. Actually, there 
is an analogy between the penal order system and American prac-
tice, but it gives no comfort to those who seek to find plea bargaining 
in Germany. The real parallel is the short-form American citation 
practice for traffic offenses: "Pay this fine or appear in court."53 A 
German accused who waives trial and accepts a penal order for 
shoplifting or drunk driving does so for the same reasons that an 
American waives his right to trial on a charge of running a stop sign 
- not in exchange for a lesser sanction, but to save the time, nui-
sance, occasional notoriety, and occasional defense costs involved in 
waging hopeless contest. Penal order procedure does permit the ac-
cused who waives trial to spare himself these "process costs," but to 
equate such an inconsiderable inducement with the coercive force of 
the sentence differential of the American plea bargaining system is 
transparent casuistry. 
B. Confession at Trial 
Having explained why Germans accused of run-of-the-mill mis-
demeanors often confess without sentencing inducement in the non-
trial penal order procedure, I now tum to the aspect of German trial 
procedure that has sometimes been misconstrued as evidencing plea 
bargaining. The accused is known to confess in a substantial propor-
tion of the cases that go to trial. In the Casper and Zeise! sample 
there was an unrecanted confession in 41% of the cases tried.54 That 
such figures would excite suspicion amongst Anglo-American ob-
52. See Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60 
(1968). 
53. I suggested this comparison in Langbein, supra note 27, at 457. Felstiner, supra note 
37, at 323, calls this illustration inapt because "penal orders are used for offenses that arc much 
more serious and complicated than traffic violations, including a considerable amount of pred-
atory co=ercial practice." This criticism is misplaced. In advancing the comparison I was 
not saying that the Germans used penal order procedure only in cases in which we would use 
traffic citations. I was pointing out how the concessionary mechanics of German penal order 
procedure resemble those of our traffic citation system, which point Felstiner does not dispute. 
54. Casper & Zeise!, supra note 12, at 146-47. 
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servers is natural, for in our procedural world the unrecanted conf es-
sion and the trial are (practically speaking) mutually exclusive. It is 
tempting to treat such figures as evincing the "functional equivalent" 
of plea bargaining, a "regular pattern of expectations" that 
"[d]efendants who do not challenge the prosecutor's case can expect 
greater leniency than those who deny their guilt."55 
This assumed case for a sentencing differential does not with-
stand careful analysis of the reality of German practice. Our starting 
point is to recall that German procedure requires that every offense 
which might result in imprisonment must go to trial (unless, of 
course, it is dismissed outright for want of factual basis). Because 
they have no nontrial procedure for felony and grave misdemeanors, 
the Germans bring to trial the cases of overwhelming evidence, in-
cluding even the caught-in-the-act type, that the American system 
would most likely process through plea bargaining. Precisely be-
cause an accused will be put to trial56 whether or not he confesses, he 
cannot inflict significant costs upon the prosecution or the court by 
contesting such a case. 
Confessions are tendered at trial not for reward, but because 
there is no advantage to be wrung from the procedural system by 
withholding them. The accused knows what prospective evidence is 
in the dossier, he knows what evidence the prosecutor has asked the 
court to take at trial, and he is always examined about the matters 
charged against him (although, as indicated, he has the privilege to 
remain silent). 
People do not like to be caught lying, even people who have al-
ready been caught committing serious crimes. It is ordinary human 
nature not to deny the obvious when the truth is certain to come out 
55. McDon~ld, supra note 3, at 386. 
56. Goldstein and Marcus see a "subtle analogue" to American plea bargaining in the case 
of serious crime in which the accused confesses at trial. "The uncontested trial is brief; few 
witnesses are called; and the judge sees his task in calling witnesses less as developing the facts 
than as confirming the confession." Goldstein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 267-68. 
The analogue is in truth too subtle to make any sense. It is indeed true that a credible 
confession ordinarily has such probative force that it allows the court to call fewer witnesses 
and to probe less deeply than when guilt is contested. However, Casper and Zeisel found that 
the saving in trial time in cases with full confession compared to those without was only 50% 
for the two principal trial courts, "differences [that] are much smaller than one would expect 
on the basis of American experience." Casper & Zeisel, supra note 12, at 150, co=enting on 
their Table 20, id. at 151 (data from ScMffengericht and grosse Strafkammer). Furthermore, 
in most confession cases the evidence is so overwhelming that the savings in trial time on 
account of the confession would not be substantial. Furthermore, even when the dossier 
records a pretrial confession, the court must prepare for a contested trial and su=on suffi-
cient witnesses to conduct one, since the accused may recant the confession at trial. There is 
still a world of juridical difference between an American court taking a plea and a German 
court adjudicating guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the evidence. 
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anyway. In such circumstances the accused who confesses needs no 
reward beyond his own dignity and self-esteem. Every schoolboy 
who has been caught with his hand in the cookie jar understands this 
point. Only the Anglo-American lawyer, mired in his uniquely defi-
cient criminal procedure system, can regard such unbargained-for 
statements as unnatural. 
The Continental criminal procedural tradition forthrightly en-
courages an accused to yield to this natural impulse to make a clean 
breast of the inevitable. Free of our system of adversary presenta-
tion of evidence and the attendant notions of party burdens of proof, 
German courts do not have to wait for a "prosecution case" to be 
established from the mouths of others before turning to the accused 
for his views on the charges against him. In the German code the 
only important rule of sequence that limits the discretion of the trial 
court in the conduct of its proof-taking is the requirement that the 
court hear first from the accused. 57 Important safeguards ensure that 
this examination of the accused - this invitation to confess -is not 
oppressive. The privilege against self-incrimination protects the ac-
cused in his right to remain silent; the court must instruct him about 
this right; and his counsel will have studied the dossier and have 
advised him about the strength and character of the evidence that is 
likely to be adduced at the trial.58 Secure in the effectiveness of these 
safeguards, German law welcomes those confessions that can be ob-
tained without American-style reward. 
Furthermore, a prominent component of the 41 % German trial 
confession rate is a type of case in which, far from concealing some 
American-style sentencing deal or tariff, the real dispute concerns 
the sentence. Where the disagreement between prosecutor and ac-
cused is not about liability but about sanction, the accused and his 
counsel will not waste time at trial contesting evidence that they 
know will establish culpability. They will concede guilt in order to 
concentrate on the mitigating factors that they hope will persuade 
the court against the prosecutor's views on sentence. 
Those American critics who seize upon the 41 % figure as ipso 
facto evidence of a German plea bargaining system have ignored the 
implications of the immense difference between 41 % and the figures 
for felony disposition by plea that currently range upward from 95% 
in some American jurisdictions. 59 In a legal system like the German 
57. STPO §§ 243(1V), 244(1). 
58. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 72-73. 
59. Figures from 95 to 99% for various cities are collected in Langbein, supra note I, at 9 
n.11. 
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that has (1) effective pretrial dismissal mechanisms for groundless 
cases, (2) a rule that every case of imprisonable crime not thus dis-
missed must go to trial, and (3) a nonadversarial procedural system 
designed to encourage unbargained-for confessions in open-and-shut 
cases, there is nothing unreasonable about the proposition that 41 % 
of the cases are so open-and-shut that the defendants admit the 
charges for no better reason than that contest is hopeless. 
German courts do sometimes credit the contrition of the con-
fessed defendant as a mitigating factor in sentencing, 60 and part of 
the motivation for some defendants to confess must be the hope of 
thereby inspiring sentencing leniency. All of the purposes of the 
criminal law, especially the reformative but the retributive and the 
deterrent as well, incline sentencing courts to distinguish where they 
can between remorseful and obdurate off enders. This intrinsically 
sound distinction is debased in American plea bargaining practice. 
Contrition has become a nominal justification for sentencing dis-
crepancies developed for procedural expediency; real regard is given 
only to whether the accused has waived his right to trial. The 
Germans, who must fully try every imprisonable offense, are not liv-
ing the American lie. The German supreme court has expressly pro-
hibited sentencing courts from pressuring defendants to confess 
"through the threat of disadvantage - such as a more severe sen-
tence .... Therefore, it is forbidden (unzulassig) to punish more 
leniently the criminal who confesses, solely on account of his confes-
sion .... "61 
Accordingly, for the Germans to be running a plea bargaining 
system, thousands of professional judges have to be linked in a crim-
inal conspiracy to conceal the real grounds of sentencing, a conspir-
acy so successful that it has remained impervious to all forms of 
detection other than conjecture in American law journals. We recall 
that two laymen deliberate and vote with the professional judges in 
setting the sentences in all these cases. If the professionals were op-
60. The statutory criteria for sentencing in Germany include, inter a/ia, the culprit's guilt 
and "his conduct after the crime, especially his efforts to make amends for the harm (sein 
Verhalten nach der Tat, besonders sein BemOhen, den Schaden widergutzumachen)." 
STRAFGESETZBUCH (Code of Criminal Law) § 46. 
61. I Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Strafsachen 105, 106 (1951). The same 
decision recognized, however, that circumstances contained in a confession may bear on such 
permissible grounds of sentencing as the extent of the offender's culpability and his dangerous-
ness to society. Id Once again, it is instructive to see how the leading manual for defense 
lawyers treats this subject. The tendering of the confession of a genuinely guilty accused, says 
Dahs, supra note 40, at 260, permits counsel to narrow and direct the court's attention to 
ameliorating factors in the accused's background and his criminal conduct. Dahs gives not the 
least hint that confession is systematically rewarded, as in American plea bargaining practice. 
222 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 78:204 
erating a clandestine plea bargaining system, they would be faced 
with the extremely difficult task of deceiving the laymen in the actual 
course of sentencing deliberations regarding the objects of particular 
sentences, or attempting to make knowing accomplices out of the 
entire cohort of citizens who serve on these panels. In this connec-
tion it is revealing to notice that in the 41 % of Casper and Zeisel's 
cases in which there was a full confession, the time spent on deliber-
ation (as distinct from trial time) differed "hardly at all"62 from the 
cases in which guilt was contested. Confession does not lead to rub-
ber-stamp sentencing; sentencing is discussed and justified in all 
cases. 
Intangibles may affect adjudication, and it is relatively costless 
for an accused thus to try to make a good impression. Counsel the 
world over instruct their clients to appear in court cleanly attired, 
although sentencing codes do not direct courts to take account of an 
accused's dress and grooming. I have no doubt that confession, like 
a clean shave, belongs to the realm of things that make a good im-
pression on a German court. But there can be no difficulty in distin-
guishing between a clean shave and cutting one's throat; neither can 
there be a problem distinguishing the trivial inducements to confess 
that exist in German procedure from the enormous and systematic 
sentence differentials that Americans have constructed in order to 
subvert the right to trial. It is we, not they, who engage in condem-
nation without adjudication and who employ a sentence differential 
that risks pressuring the accused to bear false witness against him-
self.63 
No modem multi-factored sentencing system, the German in-
cluded, can lack for rubrics such as "contrition" or "degree of culpa-
bility'' behind which it would be possible to conceal American-style 
sentence differentials. What the Germans lack is the need to engage 
in the perversion. Having kept their trial procedure workable, they 
have not had to coerce defendants into waiving either the form or 
the substance of trial. American detractors of German procedure 
have not been able to point to evidence of American-style sentence 
differentials in German practice, despite the considerable expertise 
that Americans have acquired in recent years in identifying and 
measuring this mainspring of their own plea bargaining system. 
Within Germany there are potent incentives for criminal defendants, 
defense counsel, legal academics, politicians, and journalists to un-
62. Casper & Zeise!, supra note 12, ·at 149. 
63. See Alschuler, supra note 52, at 59-60. 
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mask the legal system in a lie so enormous. The American. critics 
have, therefore, a great deal to account for when neither they nor 
interested Germans have been able to detect the German plea bar-
gaining system. In truth, it is a figment of wishful American. imagi-
nation., projecting on.to others our own distinctive fl.aw. American. 
plea bargaining results from the breakdown. of American. trial proce-
dure. Blessed with an expeditious non.adversarial trial procedure, 
the Germans need no such subterfuge. 
C. . Petty Crime 
Continental and Anglo-American. criminal procedural systems 
both exhibit as an organizing principle the idea that the full set of 
procedures and safeguards appropriate for determining charges of 
serious crime need not be extended to cases of petty crime. In Amer-
ican. law this distinction. is most prominently reflected in the 
Supreme Court's refusal to apply the sixth amendment right to jury 
trial in petty cases. 64 
In German law, too, several of the most fundamental principles 
of criminal procedure have been restricted to cases of serious crime. 
We have previously noticed that the rule of compulsory trial applies 
only to imprison.able offenses, thereby permitting the non.trial pen.al 
order procedure for many misdemeanors. We have also emphasized 
that the rule of compulsory prosecution. applies only to felonies and 
to those misdemeanors that can.not be fit within the two statutory 
criteria of pettiness (min.or guilt and lack of public interest) under 
which section 153 permits discretionary non.prosecution.. 
At bottom, of course, this tendency of legal systems to remit cases 
of lesser crime to a more brusque procedural subsystem is a response 
to resource scarcity. Such cases usually raise only simple issues of 
fact and law. If parking tickets were to be proceduralized indistin-
guishably from homicides, the criminal justice system would need to 
be :financed more lavishly than any modem society has yet shown 
itself able to afford. Accordingly, less meticulous fact-finding and 
otherwise lower levels of safeguard are permitted for offenses where 
the complexity, the sanctions, and the stigma are correspondingly 
lower. 
I have elsewhere described at length the multi-faceted German 
procedural response to the twentieth-century explosion. of petty regu-
64. Despite the seeming breadth of the constitutional language ("In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial ... by an impartial jury .... "). U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added); see Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970). 
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latory and motor vehicle o.ffenses.65 For present purposes it will suf-
fice to repeat66 that one of these procedures, the conditional 
nonprosecution scheme of section 153a, can correctly be character-
ized as a mild form of plea bargaining. In a case of misdemeanor 
that satisfies the pettiness criteria of section 153, section 153a autho-
rizes the prosecutor to decline to prosecute on condition that the ac-
cused agree to make a charitable donation, make restitution to the 
victim, engage in stipulated charitable work, or the like.67 The ac-
cused who accepts the conditions thereby waives trial and escapes 
with a lesser sanction, one that completely spares him the stigma and 
practical consequences of criminal conviction. Although section 
153a has thus far been confined overwhelmingly to traffic violations 
and otherwise narrowly interpreted,68 the only statutory limits on the 
misdemeanors to which it might be applied are the two general crite-
ria of pettiness of section 153. 
Americans seeking solace for American plea bargaining in Ger-
man practice sometimes purport to find it in section 153a. They can 
succeed only by engaging in a fundamental confusion of categories. 
Nothing done under section 153a bears on the constancy with which 
German criminal justice prohibits plea bargaining or any analogue 
of plea bargaining in its procedures for serious crime. In the United 
States 95% of felony cases are disposed of by plea,69 in Germany 
none. Hence in the realm of serious crime, serious criminal sanc-
tions, and serious criminal procedure, Germany is indeed a land 
without plea bargaining. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Americans are justly wary of claims that plea bargaining does not 
exist. We are periodically subjected to the announcement that some 
prosecutor has abolished plea bargaining, after which we learn that 
implicit plea bargaining has continued, supported by sentencing dif-
ferentials as drastic and coercive as before. We also know that in our 
own history plea bargaining was long pretended not to exist, and we 
have more recently seen the English duplicate our former reluctance 
65. Langbein, supra note 27, at 451-61. 
66. Id at 460. 
67. See the translation in J. LANGBEIN, supra note 9, at 158. 
68. See Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutor/al J)is-
cretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468, 489-93 (1974) (discussing the procedure now 
authorized by STPO § 153a as of the time when its authority was in ministerial regulations 
under STPO § 153). 
69. See note 59 supra. 
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to admit our dependence on plea bargaining.70 
Healthy suspicion has healthy limits, however. What recent 
American critics of German procedure have failed to grasp ( or at 
least failed to admit) is that the healthy American suspicion about 
plea bargaining has had a peculiarly indigenous context, in the 
breakdown of common law trial procedure under the ever mounting 
weight of the adversary system. Because the Germans have kept 
their trial procedure workable and nonadversarial, they have not 
had reason to subvert it. By overlooking that fundamental differ-
ence, the universalist theory of plea bargaining has rooted itself in 
error. 
We are less likely in the long run to be able to preserve the 
strengths of Anglo-American criminal procedure if we refuse to ad-
mit the failings - or, what is the same thing, pretend that the fail-
ings are universal. The truth is that other procedural systems have 
not become dependent on plea bargaining because they have not 
corrupted their trial procedures. We must correct our blunder, not 
wish it on others. 
70. See text at note 38 supra. 
